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Avoiding Broken Noses
How “Pragmatic” was the Philosophy of Thomas Reid?1
Adrian Sackson
AUTHOR'S NOTE
My thanks to the reviewers for their very helpful comments, and to the NYU Global
Research Institute in Tel Aviv, which enabled me to complete the final version of this
article.
1 The intellectual affinity between Thomas Reid, on one hand, and American pragmatists
such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, on the other, has been
noted by several scholars. Indeed, Peirce himself professed an admiration for Reid and
referred to his own version of Pragmatism as entailing what he called “Critical Common-
sensism” (Peirce 1966: 204-15). In recent times, a number of scholars – chiefly Baumann,
Magnus, and Lundestad – have investigated the pragmatist elements in Reid’s thought.
Each has identified important ways in which Reid prefigured central themes in American
pragmatist thought, though none has gone so far as to label Reid himself a pragmatist.
2 Of course,  a  discussion about  what  constitute the “essential”  features of  Pragmatism
would be meaningless, since there are significant differences among the classic American
pragmatist thinkers themselves, and any attempt to define the boundaries of a school of
thought is subject to arbitrary choices. Nevertheless, I believe that it can be shown that
Reid’s approach to epistemic normativity and the justification of belief incorporates a
comprehensive range of pragmatist elements. He is, I claim, closer to the tradition of
American Pragmatism than has been suggested previously, and the differences between
Reid  and  any  given  pragmatist  thinker  may  be  no  greater  than  those  between
‘undisputed’ pragmatists, such as Peirce and James.
3 In this paper, I hope to show the extent of the similarities between Reid and some of the
early American pragmatists. In light of these parallels, the term “pragmatist” may, in my
opinion, be helpful for categorising Reid’s thought. My central claim, however, is not
merely a terminological one: Rather, I hope to demonstrate the deep and broad affinity
Avoiding Broken Noses
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-2 | 2014
1
between Reid’s Common Sense philosophy and major trends in American Pragmatism, by
shedding light on a number of distinct and central shared features – some of which have
been pointed out previously, and others that have not. In the first section of the paper, I
will discuss analyses of Reid’s relationship with Pragmatism by Baumann, Magnus, and
Lundestad. I will examine the debate between Baumann and Magnus regarding which
aspects of Reid’s thought constitute its (proto-) pragmatist elements. I will also explore
Lundestad’s  argument  that  Pragmatism can “save”  Reid’s  Common Sense  philosophy
from its deepest flaw. My central interest here will be to identify important similarities
between Reid and the American pragmatists which emerge from these discussions.
4 In the second section, I will present a more thoroughgoing analysis of the similarities
highlighted by Baumann, Magnus, and Lundestad, as well as additional features which
they do not discuss. As I hope to show, Reid is even closer to the central currents of
American Pragmatism than any of these scholars has suggested. Of course, Reid belonged
to a different time and place than the American pragmatist thinkers. Nevertheless, the
intellectual affinity between them is both deep and broad sufficiently so, in my opinion,
to justify the characterisation of Reid as belonging, in important respects, to the diverse
and rich school of thought known as Pragmatism.
 
A Proto-Pragmatist? Baumann, Magnus, and
Lundestad
5 There is one important passage by Reid which Baumann, Magnus, and Lundestad all cite
in their respective discussions of Reid’s affinity with Pragmatism – though they interpret
it differently. This passage appears in the context of Reid’s discussion of three reasons
that he does not accept sceptics’ arguments against trust in human perception. Reid’s
second reason is highly relevant for our purposes, so I present it here:
I think it would not be prudent to throw off this belief [in perception], if it were in
my power...I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my nose against a post that
comes in my way; I step into a dirty kennel; and, after twenty such wise rational
actions, I am taken up and clapped into a mad-house. Now, I confess I would rather
make one of the credulous fools whom Nature imposes upon, than of those wise and
rational philosophers who resolve to withhold assent at all this expense. (Reid 1983:
85-6)
6 We see  here  a  decidedly  pragmatic  justification  for  trusting  perception:  Doing  so  is
practically beneficial to the individual. Since I gain from my trust in perception and suffer
from distrust in it, I should affirm that perception is reliable. Even if nature is actually
“imposing”  on  me,  this  is  irrelevant,  since  my  interactions  with  the  “incorrectly”
perceived world around me can still cause me very tangible suffering –for example, in the
form of a broken nose. Reid’s argument continues with an additional claim:
If a man pretends to be a sceptic with regard to the informations of sense, and yet
prudently keeps out of harm’s way as other men do, he must excuse my suspicion,
that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon himself. For, if the scale of his
belief were so evenly poised as to lean no more to one side than to the contrary, it is
impossible that his actions could be directed by any rules of common prudence.
(Reid 1983: 86)
7 This second part of the argument is directed against the actions of a “so-called” sceptic.
According to Reid, an individual’s actions betray her true beliefs. Thus, a “sceptic” who
claims to have no trust in human perception, but who nevertheless behaves in a way that
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enables her to avoid walking into kennels and breaking her nose, arouses Reid’s suspicion
that she is not truly a sceptic. With these passages in mind, let us examine the claims
made by Baumann and Magnus.
8 In  a  1999  article,  Baumann claims  that  Reid’s  Common Sense  philosophy  involves  a
rejection of the alternative between Scepticism and Dogmatism. Since the principles of
common sense are,  for  Reid,  first  truths,  they are not  and cannot  be justified using
reason. This opens the door to Scepticism, on one hand, and Dogmatism, on the other.
The Common Sense philosopher refuses “to carry the burden of proof at all: arguing only
for the thesis that we cannot argue for the principles of common sense,” Baumann writes.
As  such,  he  “moves  close  to  a  bad  dogmatist  neighbourhood  and  risks  becoming  a
dogmatist himself who just asserts the truth of his first principles without arguing for it”
(Baumann 1999: 51). On the other hand, rather than accepting these first truths without
justification, a philosopher might choose “not to make any truth and knowledge claims
concerning the principles of common sense and thus to avoid any further justificatory
burdens” (Baumann 1999: 51). According to Baumann, this sceptical option – which Reid
identifies with Hume – is “the common sense philosopher’s hell.” Baumann argues that
Reid, in his desire to reject both Dogmatism and Scepticism, charts a third way which
“hints” at a pragmatist solution (Baumann 1999: 51).
9 How does Reid resolve this dilemma? According to Baumann, he points in the direction of
a solution by attempting – at least to some extent – to shift the discussion away from
justification of our view of the world and toward description of it.  Baumann cites Reid
himself, who claims that most people are shaped by nature and conditioning: “Most men
continue all their days to be just what Nature and human education made them. Their
manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their vices, are all got by habit, imitation, and
instruction; and reason has little or no share in forming them” (Reid 2005: 201). Baumann
describes the significance of this move as follows:
We cannot justify the principles of knowledge and we do not even need to justify
them. This gives Reid’s naturalism a pragmatist twist. The search for a theoretical
justification of the principles of common sense does not even make sense. We are
asking the wrong question if we want to know reasons for first principles. To ask
for reasons here is to fundamentally misunderstand what a first principle is. This is
what Reid says, except that he is not willing to stop talking about the truth and
knowledge claims that come with the principles of common sense. To give up this
recourse to truth and knowledge would mean to fully become a pragmatist.
Even if we cannot give justifying reasons for our principles of knowledge, we can
give a totally different kind of justification: a pragmatic justification. The principles
of common sense enable us to build theories which guide our actions and let us
attain goals. Insofar as they fulfill this function, they are justified and there is no
place for a different kind of justification, no need to talk about truth or knowledge
[...].  To be sure, Reid does not make this last step. He does not really talk about
pragmatic justification. But he is very close to this kind of pragmatism and I wanted
to show here that he is much closer to pragmatism than one might think at first
hand. (Baumann 1999: 53)
10 According to Baumann, then, Reid is not a pragmatist, though one “might even regard
him as one of the grandfathers of pragmatism” (Baumann 1999: 53). Reid does, however,
chart out the beginnings of a route which avoids the Scepticism/Dogmatism dichotomy –
through the claim that it does not make sense to look for justifications for the principles of
common sense, and that, therefore, these principles ought to be accepted on the grounds
that they assist us in attaining our goals. Reid cannot, according to Baumann, be described
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as a pragmatist thinker, because he still talks about truth and knowledge (rather than
pragmatic  justification  alone);  and  because,  unlike  Peirce  and  other  American
pragmatists,  he  does  not  believe  that  “the  principles  of  common sense  are  open to
revision” (Baumann 1999: 53). This last claim, as we shall see later, can be questioned.
11 In a response to Baumann’s 1999 article, Magnus disagrees with Baumann’s claim that
Reid does not talk about pragmatic justification. In fact, Magnus argues, Reid does “make
a kind of pragmatic move, one that is importantly more subtle” than that suggested by
Baumann (Magnus 2004: 71). This move is found in the latter part of the “broken nose”
passage cited above. Magnus contends that the crux of this argument against Scepticism
goes further than simply claiming that belief in perceptions “gets us what we want”:
Reid’s argument is more subtle than this. He insists that sincere scepticism would
undercut practical engagement with the world and thus that the so-called sceptic
betrays a belief in the real world by managing their affairs just as common folk
do...We might call this an argument from practical commitment. If sceptics navigate
the world in the way you or I do, they already do believe in an external world […].
Sceptics are already engaged in certain practices that show that they already do
accept common sense, whatever their verbal protestations to the contrary. (Magnus
2004: 71)
12 Magnus’s understanding of Reid’s affinity with Pragmatism is thus more concerned with
Reid’s argument against Scepticism than it is with his alternative to it.  Where Baumann
understood Reid to be offering the kernel of a pragmatist “third way” – a justificatory
method  that  is  neither  dogmatist  nor  sceptical,  Magnus  sees  Reid  as  employing  an
argument against sceptics that parallels the logic of the “pragmatic maxim,” articulated
by Peirce as follows: “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearing
you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects
is the whole of your conception of the object” (Peirce 1966: 192). In “What Pragmatism
Means,” James elaborates on this principle:
The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its
respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any
one if  this  notion rather  than that  notion were true?  If  no practical  difference
whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and
all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some
practical  differences  that  must  follow from one side  or  the  other’s  being right.
(James 1977: 377)
13 In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce offers a similar account of what it means for
beliefs to be distinct:
The  essence  of  belief  is  the  establishment  of  a  habit;  and  different  beliefs  are
distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do
not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same
rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can
make them different  beliefs,  any  more  than playing  a  tune  in different  keys  is
playing different tunes. (Peirce 1966: 121)
14 According to Magnus, then, a form of argument akin to Peirce’s ‘pragmatic maxim’ is
employed by Reid against Hume and other sceptics: If there is no practical difference that
follows from adopting Scepticism, then there is no meaningful difference between it and
non-Scepticism. As Magnus puts it, “Reid applies the pragmatic method to show that the
would-be sceptic tacitly gives the lie to his scepticism by skillfully navigating the world”
(Magnus 2004: 72).
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15 In a 2004 reply to Magnus, Baumann clarifies his own claim and responds to Magnus’s
presentation  of  the  pragmatist  elements  in  Reid’s  thought.  According  to  Baumann,
Magnus’s ascription to Reid of the “argument from practical commitment” is correct –
but uncontroversial. “Do Magnus and I disagree at all? I am not so sure. I don’t doubt that
what he calls the ‘argument from practical commitment’ can be attributed to Reid. On
this point we certainly do not disagree. The problem is that this alone, without further
explanations, doesn’t cut much ice in the debate against the sceptic; even the sceptic can
agree  with  it”  (Baumann  2004:  76).  It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  Baumann  has
misunderstood  the  details  of  Magnus’s  argument.  The  claim  to  which  Baumann  is
assenting (and which he believes Magnus to be making) is that even declared “sceptics”
do  not  adopt  their  own ideas  as  practical  principles  by  which  they  live  their  lives.
Regarding this claim, Baumann writes: “I do not have any objections to this – nobody has.
Even Reid’s  arch-sceptic  Hume wholeheartedly agrees:  Nobody can live scepticism in
everyday life” (Baumann 2004: 76).
16 If I have understood Magnus correctly, however, this is not the (only) claim that he is
making. Rather, he is arguing, as I explained above, that Reid employs reasoning similar
to that of Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim” – namely, that the difference between concepts is
to be found in their practical effects. If there is no difference in outcome, there is no
justification for speaking of a difference in the concepts. To this claim, contra Baumann,
many would indeed object.
17 Aside from Baumann’s (mis)understanding of Magnus, he also offers an elaboration of the
(proto-)Pragmatism which he himself sees at work in Reid. Like Magnus, Baumann now
points to Reid’s “broken nose” passage. In this passage,
18 Baumann claims, Reid is making an argument against Scepticism that is reminiscent of
Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of induction, or of Pascal’s Wager (albeit without
Pascal’s doctrinal assumptions):
If the external world exists, then it is a more dangerous place for sceptics than for the
followers of common sense. Given that we prefer not to break our noses, common
sense is better off – given the existence of the world – than scepticism. If the external
world does not exist, then there is no difference between the two positions in terms of
practical outcomes. Hence, common sense “dominates” scepticism: The outcomes
of common sense are always at least as good as those of scepticism and they are
better under at least one circumstance (the external world exists). The solution to
our problem is clear: We should go for common sense and the belief in the existence
of the external world. This is a pragmatic and not an epistemic justification of a
principle of common sense. It leaves the epistemic status of such principles (as to
truth, justification, etc.) open; the outcomes are defined in practical rather than
epistemic terms.  However,  it  still  gives us a reason in favour of common sense,
namely a practical one. (Baumann 2004: 75; italics mine)
19 From our examination of the discussion between Baumann and Magnus, we are thus far
able to identify at least three important elements of Reid’s thought that bear similarity to
American Pragmatism: (1) Reid’s opposition to both Scepticism and Dogmatism; (2) The
“argument from practical commitment” (though I believe Baumann misunderstood what
Magnus  means  by  this,  both  readings  have  important  pragmatist  parallels);  and  (3)
Baumann’s “Pascalian”/”Reichenbachian” reading of Reid’s “broken nose” passage.
20 Finally, we come to Lundestad, who has discussed the affinity between Reid and American
Pragmatism in two separate articles (Lundestad 2006; 2008). Lundestad offers separate
but interconnected theses in these two articles: In the first, he claims that Reid’s Common
Avoiding Broken Noses
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-2 | 2014
5
Sense philosophy contains an important insight – namely, that the demands of sceptics
for justification of all beliefs cannot be met, and that “there are beliefs, such as our belief
in an external reality, which we are not in a position to doubt, and which must therefore
be taken for granted, even if we are not in position to justify them” (Lundestad 2006: 129).
This fundamental insight, however, is undermined by the stalemate in which Reid is left
against  the sceptics:  “While Reid may rightfully claim that the skeptic doesn’t  really
doubt the existence of external reality, the skeptic may, with just as much right, claim
that Reid has missed the point, namely that our belief in external reality isn’t justified”
(Lundestad 2006:  132).  According to Lundestad,  Common Sense philosophy is  “proto-
pragmatic” in the sense that Pragmatism can liberate it from the problematic premises
which lead it into this stalemate. In his second article, Lundestad argues that Scepticism
and Common Sense philosophy can be seen as  two horns  of  a  dilemma that  can be
resolved using a  pragmatic  approach.  When “one performs the pragmatic  shift  from
theory to practice, viewing our primary way of relating to the world as being practical
rather than theoretical,” a resolution of the dilemma becomes possible (Lundestad 2008:
184-5).
21 My central concern here is an interpretive one, and, as such, I will not engage here with
Lundestad’s  claims  regarding  the  possibility  of  Pragmatism  “liberating”  Reid’s
philosophical approach from its unacceptable premises. Rather, I wish to point to the
additional pragmatist elements of Reid’s thought which emerge from Lundestad’s study.
One such similarity is:  (4) the distinction between real  and apparent doubt.  Lundestad
describes this tendency in Reid as follows:
What  Reid  has  actually  done  –  even though he  never  says  so  explicitly  –  is  to
introduce a distinction between real and apparent doubt. The first person to draw
explicit attention to such a distinction was, as we know, Charles Sanders Peirce, the
founder of pragmatism and a great admirer of Reid...The point Reid is making, and
which Peirce may be seen as expanding on, is that the skeptic is guilty of conflating
that of being in doubt with that of possessing an unjustified belief. (Lundestad 2008:
177)1
22 As  noted  by  Lundestad,  Peirce  is  indeed  explicit  in  distinguishing  between real  and
apparent doubt.  Philosophy,  for Peirce (and Reid),  cannot and should not pretend to
proceed  from systematic,  yet  artificial,  doubt.  According  to  Peirce,  philosophy  must
“begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of
philosophy” (Peirce 1966: 40). Reid, meanwhile, does not use the language of “prejudice,”
but refers to “first principles” (see, for example, Reid 1983: 151-9). It is likely for this
reason that Lundestad claims that Reid, unlike the pragmatists, does not view these first
principles  themselves as  subject  to doubt at  all.  Lundestad articulates this  ostensible
difference between Reid and the pragmatists as follows:
This openness for change is of course the most striking way in which pragmatism
differs from the philosophy of common sense. While Reid maintains that common
sense  consists  of  a  set  of  beliefs  which  are  simply  to  be  taken  for  granted,  or
accepted as true, Dewey and the pragmatists, on the other hand, hold all knowledge
to be hypothetical in character. Even our most firmly held beliefs may therefore
come to be revised. (Lundestad 2006: 135)
23 Dewey is not the only pragmatist thinker who embraces a fallibilistic position, even with
respect to the most fundamental beliefs – Peirce and James share this stance.2 It seems to
me that if this difference between the pragmatists and Reid were to hold true, it would
constitute an important reason to hesitate before labelling Reid a pragmatist. I believe,
however, that there is reason to claim, against Lundestad, that Reid does in fact adopt a
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fallibilistic approach to knowledge of the principles of common sense that underpin his
philosophical system. I shall elaborate on this in the following section.
 
Pragmatist Elements in Reid
24 The question as to whether Reid can fairly be labelled a pragmatist philosopher depends,
of course, on one’s definition of Pragmatism. That being said, I am less interested here in
the terminology used to describe Reid’s thought than in the degree to which it shares
important features with the philosophical school known as Pragmatism. As such, it is
worth  noting  how Pragmatism has  been “defined”  –  not  because  any  definition can
objectively determine Pragmatism’s “essential” features, but because reflection on what
binds together the pragmatist philosophical tradition can help us identify, loosely, which
features  have  been  seen  as  constituting  central  elements  of  Pragmatism  as  a
philosophical  orientation4.3 Perhaps the most succinct characterisation of  the central
features that distinguish Pragmatism has been offered by Hilary Putnam:
What I find attractive in pragmatism is not a systematic theory in the usual sense at
all.  It  is  rather a certain group of theses,  theses which can be and indeed were
argued  very  differently  by  different  philosophers  with  different  concerns,  and
which became the basis of the philosophies of Peirce, and above all of James and
Dewey.  Cursorily  summarized,  those are (1)  antiskepticism:  pragmatists  hold that
doubt requires justification just as much as belief (recall Peirce’s famous distinction
between  “real”  and  “philosophical”  doubt;  (2)  fallibilism:  pragmatists  hold  that
there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had that such-and-such a belief will
never need revision (that one can be both fallibilistic and antiskeptical is perhaps
the  unique  insight  of  American  pragmatism);  (3)  the  thesis  that  there  is  no
fundamental dichotomy between “facts” and “values”; and (4) the thesis that, in a
certain sense, practice is primary in philosophy. (Putman 1995: 152)
25 As I hope to show, I think that Putnam is wrong when he claims that the combination of
anti-scepticism and fallibilisim is  “unique”  to  the American pragmatists  –  Reid,  too,
embraced both of these postures. Furthermore, Putnam’s third and fourth categories –
though he does not present them as essential – also seem to apply to Reid. In this section,
I will examine what I believe to be six areas in which Reid’s philosophy is closely aligned
with positions associated with American Pragmatism. Whether or not one believes that
this justifies labelling Reid himself as a pragmatist philosopher, I believe it shows his
thought  to  bear  a  similarity  to  Pragmatism  that  is  more  comprehensive  than  has
previously been suggested.
26 In the previous section, we already identified four areas of commonality, drawn out of the
studies by Baumann, Magnus, and Lundestad. These are:
Reid’s opposition to both Scepticism and Dogmatism.
The “argument from practical commitment.”
Baumann’s “Pascalian”/”Reichenbachian” reading of Reid’s “broken nose” passage.
The distinction between real and apparent doubt.
27 In addition to these four, I suggest another two commonalities:
Fallibilism with respect to first principles.
The  “rope  metaphor”  for  reasoning  (opposition  to  the  Cartesian  form  of
foundationalism).
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28 I will now elaborate on each of these similarities one by one, giving particular attention
to those features not already mentioned in the previous section.
29 Commonality (1), highlighted by Baumann, is reflected in Reid’s opposition to the type of
Scepticism which he associates with modern philosophy in general, and with Hume in
particular. “Sensible men,” Reid writes, “who never will be sceptics in matters of common
life, are apt to treat with sovereign contempt everything that hath been said, or is to be
said, upon this subject. Is it metaphysic, say they: who minds it? Let scholastic sophisters
entangle themselves in their own cobwebs; I am resolved to take my own existence, and
existence of other things, upon trust; and to believe that snow is cold, and honey sweet,
whatever they may say to the contrary. He must either be a fool, or want to make a fool of
me, that would reason me out of my reason and senses” (Reid 1983: 11). For Reid, common
sense does not need to be justified by philosophy; rather, philosophy is dependent upon
the principles of common sense. As such, “[t]o pretend to prove by reasoning that there is
no force in reason, does indeed look like a philosophical delirium. It is like a man’s
pretending to see clearly, that he himself and all other men are blind” (Reid 2002: 563).
This rejection of Scepticism resonates with the pragmatist tradition – indeed, as Putnam
noted,  it  is  an  important  feature  of  Pragmatism.  One  example  of  this  approach  to
scepticism in the pragmatist tradition appears in the thought of James, who argues that
Scepticism “is not avoidance of an option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk”
(James 1977: 732). In other words, James rejects the notion that the sceptic is choosing a
‘safer’  option by requiring justification before adopting any belief,  since, he claims, a
sceptical position necessitates justification no less.
30 I  have already discussed commonalities  (2)  and (3)  –  namely,  Reid’s  “argument from
practical  commitment”  (as  interpreted  by  Magnus);  and  Baumann’s
“Pascalian”/“Reichenbachian” interpretation of Reid’s “broken nose” argument. As we
saw in the previous section, the “argument from practical commitment,” rather than
constituting an ad hominem attack against purported sceptics who do not practise what
they preach, can be understood as a more subtle, pragmatist argument, if interpreted
against the backdrop of Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim”: “Consider what effects that might
conceivably have practical bearing you conceive the object of your conception to have.
Then your conception of  those effects is  the whole  of your conception of  the object”
(Peirce  1966:  192).  On  this  reading  of  Reid,  his  argument  amounts  to  a  pragmatist
rejection of  any distinction between Scepticism and anti-Scepticism which entails  no
difference in practical effects. This is reminiscent of Peirce’s denial of the meaningfulness
of the Catholic notion of transubstantiation in the Eucharist, on the grounds that “to talk
of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is
senseless jargon” (Peirce 1966:  124).  Perhaps unsurprisingly,  Peirce himself  is  equally
sceptical about purported sceptics: “It has often been argued that absolute scepticism is
self-contradictory; but this is a mistake...there are no such beings as absolute sceptics”
(Peirce 1992: 56). Commonality (2) – the “argument from practical commitment” thus
seems to fit with Putnam’s fourth characteristic of Pragmatism, namely, the centrality of
practice in philosophy.
31 Commonality  (3)  also  gives  practice  prime of  place  in  philosophy.  As  we saw in the
previous section, Reid’s “broken nose” passage can be read as arguing for the practical
benefit of rejecting Scepticism. After resolving to disbelieve my senses, “I break my nose
against a post that comes in my way; I step into a dirty kennel; and, after twenty such
wise rational actions, I am taken up and clapped into a mad-house” (Reid 1983: 85-6). It is
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better,  Reid says,  to  be  “fooled” by nature into trusting our  senses,  if  doing so  will
prevent pain and suffering that the alternative would bring about. As Baumann puts it, if
the external world exists, then it is preferable, in terms of practical outcomes, not to be a
sceptic; if the external world does not exist, it makes no difference whether one is a sceptic
or not. A similar line of thinking appears in a number of places in Reid’s writings. Thus,
for example, though Reid acknowledges that the principles of common sense are open to
theoretical  doubt,  he claims that  there is  nevertheless  some justification for  adopting
them. One such reason is that “when an opinion is so necessary in the conduct of life,
that, without the belief of it, a man must be led into a thousand absurdities in practice,
such an opinion, when we can give no other reason for it, may safely be taken for a first
principle” (Reid 1983: 265-6). These arguments bear some resemblance to the direction in
which James takes Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim.” While for Peirce, Pragmatism is primarily
concerned  with  discerning  meaning  –  the  practical  effects  of  two  concepts  help  us
distinguish  between  them  –  James  develops  an  argument  in  favour  of  utilising  the
pragmatic method for making decisions regarding the determination of truth. According
to James, there are certain situations in which the intellect is unable to judge between
beliefs,  and yet a choice must be made. In such cases,  a person has no choice but to
consider the practical consequences of each belief and decide volitionally.4 In both James
and  Reid,  we  see  here  some  degree  of  Putnam’s  third feature  –  a  blurring  of  the
distinction between “facts” and “values”: I accept certain beliefs about the world because
of the benefit they provide.
32 The last of the commonalities discussed above is (4) – the distinction between real and
apparent doubt. As already noted, Lundestad points out that this distinction is implicitly
present in Reid, and explicitly articulated by Peirce. Indeed, Peirce outlines his stance
against feigned, philosophically-constructed doubt as follows:
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which
we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are
not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can
be questioned. Hence this initial scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not
real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until
he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is,
therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to
get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it
is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing;
but  in  that  case  he  doubts  because  he  has  a  positive  reason for  it,  and not  on
account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we
do not doubt in our hearts. (Peirce 1966: 40)
33 For Peirce, as for Reid, the “doubt” of Descartes or of Hume does not resemble real doubt
as it is experienced in human life.
34 We now move on to commonalities that have not been noted previously in the secondary
literature.  The  first  of  these  is:  (5)  Fallibilism  with  respect  to  knowledge  of  first
principles. Peirce, of course, gives expression to the extent of his fallibilistic outlook in
the passage just quoted about real and apparent doubt. He states there: “A person may, it
is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but
in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the
Cartesian  maxim”  (Peirce  1966:  40).  In  other  words,  Peirce  regards  every  belief  as
tentative and potentially subject to revision – including those basic first principles or
basic  conceptions from which we proceed when entering the study of  philosophy.  A
process  that  begins  with  particular  assumptions  may  ultimately  lead  to  doubting,
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altering, or rejecting those very assumptions themselves. This does not, as we saw, justify
methodical doubt or Scepticism: such beliefs should be adopted confidently, even as one
recognises  their  tentative  nature  –  that  is,  the  theoretical  possibility  that  they  may
eventually be abandoned or adjusted.
35 According to both Baumann and Lundestad, Reid does not share this feature of Peirce’s
thought. Lundestad, as we saw, claims that Reid sees common sense as consisting of “a set
of  beliefs  which are simply to be taken for  granted,  or  accepted as  true,”  while  the
pragmatists “hold all knowledge to be hypothetical in character.” For the pragmatists –
but not for Reid – “even our most firmly held beliefs may therefore come to be revised”
(Lundestad 2006: 135). Baumann adopts a similar position, contrasting Reid with Peirce:
“In  contrast  […]  to  Reid,  Peirce  allows  for  historical  variation  and  critique  of  what
common sense tells us” (Baumann 1999: 53). Neither Baumann nor Lundestad is the first
to draw this distinction between Reid and the pragmatists: Peirce himself wrote that Reid
“seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe
which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake. Common Sense is to be trusted only so
far as it sustains critical investigation” (Peirce 1966: 426).
36 But does Reid really think that knowledge of the first principles of common sense is
infallible? In other words: Does Reid hold that, if a given proposition is acknowledged as a
first principle of common sense, this means necessarily that its truth has been accepted
so  conclusively  that  no  evidence  or  argument  could  ever  lead  to  its  subsequent
adjustment or rejection? I believe not. Reid has, of course, a very high level of confidence
in the truth of those propositions that he identifies as first principles of common sense.
This, however, is not the same as considering belief in these propositions to be infallible.
Indeed, at the conclusion of a discussion in which Reid outlines the “first principles” as he
understands them, he makes explicit his fallibilistic conception of them:
We do not pretend that those things that are laid down as first principles may not
be examined, and that we ought not to have our ears open to what may be pleaded
against their being admitted as such. Let us deal with them as an upright judge does
with a witness who has a fair character. He pays a regard to the testimony of such a
witness  while  his  character  is  unimpeached;  but,  if  it  can  be  shewn  that  he  is
suborned, or that he is influenced by malice or partial favour, his testimony loses
all its credit, and is justly rejected. (Reid 1983: 158-9)
37 Like Peirce (and James, and Dewey), then, Reid believes that we ought not force doubt
where  none exists,  and that  we can safely  have a  high degree  of  confidence  in  our
knowledge of the propositions identified as first principles of common sense. We are to
treat  these  propositions  “as  an  upright  judge  does  with  a  witness  who  has  a  fair
character” – that is, we are to regard the burden of proof as lying with those who would
challenge them, and not those who affirm them. Importantly,  this confidence always
remains tentative.  Just  as  a  judge’s  reliance upon the testimony of  a  “witness  of  fair
character” is confident but provisional, so too with our affirmation of the propositions
identified as first principles of common sense: These propositions are believed to be first
principles, but we ought to “have our ears open to what may be pleaded against their
being admitted as such.” Should we be faced with a good reason to doubt that a given
proposition  is  in  fact  a  first  principle,  Reid  thinks  we  can  and  should  change  our
assessment. This seems much closer to Peirce’s position than we might have thought.
38 Reid’s fallibilistic posture is also evident in a later discussion regarding resolution of
disagreement about first principles:
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But is it not possible, that men who really love truth, and are open to conviction,
may differ about first principles?
I think it is possible, and that it cannot, without great want of charity, be denied to
be possible.
When this happens, every man who believes that there is a real distinction between
truth and error,  and that the faculties which God has given us are not in their
nature  fallacious,  must  be  convinced  that  there  is  a  defect  or  a  perversion  of
judgment on the one side or the other.
A man of candour and humility will, in such a case, very naturally suspect his own
judgment, so far as to be desirous to enter into a serious examination, even of what
he has long held as a first principle. He will think it not impossible, that although
his  heart  be  upright,  his  judgment  may  have  been  perverted,  by  education,  by
authority, by party zeal, or by some other of the common causes of error, from the
influence of which neither parts nor integrity exempt the human understanding.
(Reid 1983: 258)
39 For Reid, we see here, disagreements can occur about whether a given proposition ought
to be admitted as a first principle of common sense. In such cases, a “man of candour”
might, according to Reid, “suspect his own judgment,” even with respect to “what he has
long held as a first principle.” One must accept the possibility that one has been wrong –
even with respect to beliefs held so firmly as to be regarded as first principles. Only in
such a manner can disputes be resolved. Reid continues:
In such a state of mind, so amiable, and so becoming every good man, has nature
left  him destitute of  any rational  means by which he may be enabled either to
correct his judgment if it be wrong, or to confirm it if it be right?
I  hope  it  is  not  so.  I  hope  that,  by  the  means  which  nature  has  furnished,
controversies about first principles may be brought to an issue, and that the real
lovers of truth may come to unanimity with regard to them. (Reid 1983: 258)
40 Though, for Reid, reason cannot be employed for resolving such disputes, he does think
there are some forms of justification that can be employed in order to reach a consensus.
It is telling, however, that Reid does not express conviction that all  such disputes will
ultimately reach unanimity; rather, he expresses this possibility in terms of hope. Not only
does Reid acknowledge that firmly held convictions regarding first principles may, in
certain instances, be subjected to doubt and possibly revision; he also acknowledges that
unanimity  (let  alone  absolute  certainty)  regarding  first  principles  might  never  be
achieved.
41 In light of these statements, it seems fair to describe Reid’s approach to knowledge of first
principles of common sense as a fallibilistic one. Though he may have more confidence in
his  belief  that  certain  propositions  are  first  principles  than  do  the  pragmatist
philosophers, this difference would seem to be one of degree, rather than kind. Putnam’s
second feature of Pragmatism – fallibilism – thus also seems, in an important sense, to be
present in the thought of Reid.
42 The last commonality I shall discuss is: (6) The “rope metaphor” for reasoning. Both Reid
and Peirce reject the Cartesian form of foundationalism: that is, they do not believe that
all knowledge must be derived by a series of premises from an indubitable, foundational
belief. This is not to say that a certain kind of foundationalism cannot be found in Reid’s
writings. Indeed, Reid does claim that “all knowledge, and all science, must be built upon
principles that are self-evident” (Reid 2002: 426). Later, he elaborates on this point:
When we examine, in the way of analysis, the evidence of any proposition, either
we find it self-evident, or it rests upon one or more propositions that support it.
The same thing may be said of the propositions that support it; and of those that
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support them, as far back as we can go. But we cannot go back in this track to
infinity. Where then must this analysis stop? It is evident that it must stop only
when we come to propositions, which support all that are built upon them, but are
themselves supported by none, that is, to self-evident propositions. (Reid 2002: 455)
43 For Reid,  first  principles  of  common sense serve as “foundations” upon which other
knowledge is based. This, however, is different in very important respects from the kind
of  foundationalism associated  with  Descartes,  who,  according  to  Reid,  “thought  one
principle, expressed in one word cogito, a sufficient foundation for his whole system, and
asked no more” (Reid 2002: 454). Two important differences can be noted: First, as already
highlighted,  Reid  acknowledges  the  possibility  of  doubting  a  proposition  previously
affirmed as a first principle. Such beliefs, though held firmly, are not indubitable, and yet
they nevertheless can serve as foundations for knowledge. Second, Reid – like Peirce –
sees great  diversity and variety in the possible substance of  evidence and argument,
claiming that there is no single form of argument to which others can be reduced. Thus,
Reid observes:
Philosophers have endeavoured, by analysing the different sorts of evidence, to find
out some common nature wherein they all agree, and thereby to reduce them all to
one... I am not able to find any common nature to which they may all be reduced.
They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by Nature to produce
belief  in  the  human  mind,  some  of  them  in  the  highest  degree,  which  we  call
certainty, others in various degrees according to circumstances. (Reid 1983: 200-1)
44 That which “produce[s] belief in the human mind” qualifies, according to Reid, as reliable
evidence; there is no one specific form of argument to which others may be reduced. A
very similar sentiment is articulated by Peirce in the interesting distinction he draws
between an argument, which he defines as “any process of thought reasonably tending to
produce a definite belief,” and an argumentation, which is “an Argument proceeding upon
definitely formulated premisses”5 Arguments,  for Peirce, come in a variety of radically
different forms, and do not necessarily share anything more than the fact that they, to
borrow Reid’s words, “produce belief in the human mind.”
45 Furthermore, Reid and Peirce both illustrate their (respective) pluralistic approaches to
the diverse methods of epistemic justification by suggesting a “rope of many strands”
metaphor for reasoning, as opposed to the “links in a chain” metaphor often used to
characterise Cartesian foundationalism. Reid introduces this metaphor in his discussion
of probable reasoning:
The strength of probable reasoning, for the most part, depends not upon any one
argument, but upon many, which unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion.
Any one of them by itself would be insufficient to convince; but the whole taken
together may have a force that is irresistible, so that to desire more evidence would
be absurd... Such evidence may be compared to a rope made up of many slender
filaments twisted together. The rope has strength more than sufficient to bear the
stress laid upon it, though no one of the filaments of which it is composed would be
sufficient for that purpose. (Reid 2002: 556)
46 This description has a direct parallel in Peirce, though the latter does not quote Reid
directly:
Philosophy ought to imitate  the successful  sciences  in  its  methods,  so far  as  to
proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to careful scrutiny,
and  to  trust  rather  to  the  multitude  and  variety  of  its  arguments  than  to  the
conclusiveness  of  any  one.  Its  reasoning  should  not  form  a  chain  which  is  no
stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender,
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provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected. (Peirce 1966:
40-1)
47 For both thinkers, then, belief can be justified through multiple forms of evidence and
argument, which are not necessarily derived from a common foundational premise. These
various forms of argument operate independently of  one another,  but reinforce each
other. There is no single form of reasoning to which others can be reduced; and there is
no single, incorrigible, indubitable foundation upon which all other knowledge is based.
On the contrary: the more forms of argument and evidence that can be accumulated, the
greater the degree of certainty. Unlike (Cartesian) thinking which operates in accordance
with the “links in the chain” metaphor, according to which negation of a foundational
premise necessarily  “breaks  the chain” of  evidence,  Reid and Peirce  both affirm the
possibility that a belief might remain intact following the abandonment of a foundational
premise, if other forms of argument and evidence are employed whose authority and
reliability stand independently of the abandoned premise.
48 We have now seen that Reid shares with the American pragmatists all four of the central
features described by Putnam. Like the pragmatists, Reid is anti-sceptical; he is a fallibilist
–  including  with  respect  to  knowledge  of  first  principles;  he  blurs  the  fact/  value
distinction  in  important  respects;  and  his  approach  to  perception  and  epistemic
normativity brings practice to the fore. It should be noted, of course, that this series of
commonalities is not necessarily exhaustive; nor should it be taken as implying that there
are no important differences between Reid and any of the American pragmatists.6 Related
areas in which exploration of similarities and differences might be fruitful include: the
relationship between reasoning and habit;7 the thinkers’ respective attitudes to direct
realism;8 and  the  influence  of  Charles  Darwin  upon  the  American  pragmatists. 9
Nevertheless, the commonalities outlined here indicate a very strong affinity between
Reid’s thought and the Pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey.
 
Final Words
49 In  the  above  analysis,  I  have  shown  the  deep  similarity  between  Thomas  Reid  and
American pragmatist thinkers – in particular, Charles S. Peirce and William James. We
have seen, through analysis of Baumann’s, Magnus’s, and Lundestad’s discussions, and
through investigation of  the primary texts themselves,  that  there is  a wide range of
respects in which Reid’s approach to epistemic justification and sense perception is very
similar  to  those  that  characterise  the  classic  American  pragmatists.  Indeed,  Reid’s
philosophy possesses all of the features described by Hilary Putnam as characteristic of
the pragmatist tradition. To my mind, the extent and depth of these similarities render
the term “pragmatist” a useful descriptor for Reid. Nevertheless, the definitional question
is not key: Rather, what is important is the very close intellectual affinity between Reid
and the pragmatists upon which I have hopefully shed light.
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NOTES
1. See also Lundestad (2008: 184-5; 2006: 133).
2. See, for example, Peirce (1966: 40).
3. On the difficulty of defining Pragmatism, see Bernstein 2010. In particular, Bernstein writes:
“It is best to think of the discourse about pragmatism as an open-ended conversation with many
loose  ends  and tangents.  I  don’t  mean an ‘idealized’  conversation or  dialogue,  so  frequently
described and praised by philosophers. Rather, it is a conversation more like the type that occurs
at  New York dinner  parties  where  there  are  misunderstandings,  speaking at  cross-purposes,
conflicts,  and contradictions,  with personalized voices stressing different points of view (and
sometimes talking at the same time). It can seem chaotic, yet somehow the entire conversation is
more vital and illuminating than any of the individual voices demanding to be heard. This is
what the conversation of pragmatism has been like” (Bernstein 2010: 30-1).
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4. In “The Will to Believe,” James writes: “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide
an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open’, is
itself a passional decision – just like deciding yes or no – and is attended with the same risk of losing the
truth” (James 1977: 723; italics in original).
5. This distinction appears in Peirce’s “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1966: 359).
6. Of course, the differences between the American pragmatists themselves are significant. Such
disagreements eventually led Peirce to adopt an alternative term – “pragmaticism” – to describe
his own thought and distinguish it from others (including James) who had come to be described
as pragmatists. See Peirce (1966: 186).
7. See, for example, Reid (2002: 543); Peirce (1966: 91-112).
8. Reid (1983:  272-3).  Some have characterized Pragmatism as anti-realist.  Putnam, however,
views James and Peirce as direct realists (Putnam 1996). 10. See Lundestad (2006: 133-6).
9. See Lundestad (2006: 133-6).
ABSTRACTS
The intellectual affinity between Thomas Reid, on one hand, and American pragmatists such as
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, on the other, has been noted by several
scholars.  Indeed,  Peirce  himself  professed  an  admiration  for  Reid  and  referred  to  his  own
Pragmatism as entailing what he called “Critical Common-sensism.” In recent times, a number of
scholars – chiefly Baumann, Magnus, and Lundestad – have investigated the pragmatist elements
in Reid’s thought. Each has identified important ways in which Reid prefigured central themes in
American pragmatist thought, though none has gone so far as to label Reid himself a pragmatist.
In this paper, I demonstrate the great extent of the similarities between Reid and some of the
early  American  pragmatists.  In  light  of  these  affinities,  the  term  “pragmatist”  may,  in  my
opinion, be helpful for categorising Reid’s thought. My central claim, however, is not merely a
terminological one: Rather, I  attempt to demonstrate the deep and broad intellectual affinity
between  Reid’s  “Common  Sense”  philosophy  and  major  trends  in  American  Pragmatism,  by
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